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Oh, what a tangled web we weave
When first we practise to deceive!
—Walter Scott
e purpose of this paper is to put the study of mimicry on the information se-
curity research map. Mimicry in humans has received little scholarly attention.
Sociologist Diego Gambetta has constructed a framework that enables reason-
ing about episodes of mimicry based on trust in signs. By looking at the problem
of phishing the applicability of this framework to problems of mimicry in infor-
mation security system was tested. It was found that while the framework offers
valuable insights, it needs to be updated since the assumptions that it makes
do not hold in practice. A new framework is proposed, built on the core ideas
of Gambetta’s framework, and extended with results from a literature study of
phishing and other sources. is framework has been used for finding possible
solutions to problems in web browser interface design. Because the nature of au-
thentication was found to be the observation of discriminatory signals the paper
also discusses the ethical issues surrounding the use of credentials.
We hope that this paper will help system designers in finding and choosing
appropriate credentials for authentication. By using the proposed framework a
system can be analysed for the presence of credentials that enable the discrim-
ination between genuine users and impostors. e framework can also serve as
a method for identifying the dynamics behind user verification of credentials.
e two problems that the framework can help address are the impersonation of
providers and the impersonation of users. Like much other security research the
results of this paper can be misused by attackers. It is expected that the frame-
work will be more useful for defenders than attackers, as it is of an analytical
nature, and cannot be used directly in any attacks.
Since this study is of an exploratory nature the findings of the study need to




. Research Focus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 T, M,  C 
. Basic Trust Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. Mimic-Beset Trust Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. Signalling Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. Identity Signalling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. Sign Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. Mimicry Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. Applicability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. Mimicry during Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 P 
. Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. Usability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. Security by Default . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. Takedown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. Looking Forward . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 R G 
. Revisiting Rationality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. A Tentative Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 F S 
. Cognitive Walkthroughs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. Web Browser Interfaces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. Other Avenues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 E 
. Biometrics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. Other Credentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. Control Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. Guidance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 C 
1 Introduction
e story Ali Baba and the Fortyieves clearly illustrates the threat of mimicry
and the dangers of easy to fake credentials. Were it not for this seed of trouble
the thieves might still be alive. Tales of mimicry are plenty in art and in real life.
Since the th century a lot of work has been done to understandmimicry in an-
imals. is is in contrast to mimicry in humans which has received scant schol-
arly attention []. Work on mimicry in the information security field appears
similarly thin. ere has been some mathematical work on subverting intrusion
detection systems [] and detecting stolen user credentials [], as well as
investigations into the ease of spoofing biometrics [, , , ]. We are not
aware of an in-depth look atmimicry in information security and seek to provide
it here.
1.1 Research Focus
In addition to dealing with insecurity from a risk management perspective, hu-
mans also approach it as a trust problem []. Besides implementing measures
to decrease their risk, they engage in trust acts, seeking others that they think
are unlikely to take advantage of their vulnerability. At the moment the infor-
mation security field is mainly concerned with risk management and assurance,
even though placing trust correctly can lead to a better and more efficient cul-
ture []. is is evident in the use of the word ‘trust’, which more often than not
merely means ‘assurance’. Take cryptography: in contrast to the prevalent dis-
course it cannot support trust directly []. However, even in situations where
assurance is claimed to obviate the need for trust (e.g. through contracts), trust
must still be placed in those who operate the control mechanisms []. In infor-
mation security, trust plays an important role since interactions between entities
often involves a degree of reliance and vulnerability [].
Because of the importance of trust in information security systemswe thought
it important to develop a better understanding of trust dynamics. To do so sev-
eral works [, , , ] by sociologist Diego Gambetta were consulted. ese
works find that people do not trust in others directly, but instead ‘trust in signs’
[] thatmediate the knowledge of the other’s trustworthiness, which is supported
by many anecdotes [] and descriptive studies of taxi drivers [] and criminals
[]. e main trust problem is finding reliable signs that evidence someone’s
trust warranting characteristics, not determining what these characteristics are.
Often the characteristics of a trustworthy person are known, but the signs that
mediate them are difficult to rely on because mimics corrupt them. Mimics pass
themselves off as trustworthy individuals by displaying signs that get them mis-

taken for trustworthy individuals. Because distinguishing real from fake is the
biggest obstacle to placing trust correctly, the threat of mimicry is the foremost
trust problem.
Phishing is a model problem for researching usability concerns in informa-
tion security, with insights applicable to a wide range of other usability prob-
lems []. It also seems a model problem when looking at mimicry, with sim-
ilar generalizability. However, researching phishing can be problematic: obser-
vational studies take a lot of time, laboratory studies suffer from unmotivated
participants, interviews do not give an accurate picture of the actual behaviour
of users, and live experiments bring ethical and legal problems []. Deceiving
participants without informed consent is deemed unethical [], although this is-
sue has been brushed aside by some researchers [] which is irresponsible and
a very slippery slope. is does not mean that empirical research is impossible,
but current approaches do have their issues and more work appears necessary
in determining appropriate guidelines and viable research methodologies. For
this research a theoretical approach was found to be appropriate since it is an
exploratory study. e project is a descriptive study of mimicry during authen-
tication. Although this does not allow a proper scientific test of hypotheses, it
does provide potentially fruitful material for further research []. e results of
the study can be tested in empirical experiments by those who want to sail these
waters, but they should know where the rocks are to prevent running aground.
By looking at mimicry in the information security field this project responds
to calls for an interdisciplinary approach to the study of mimicry []. e in-
formation security discipline can contribute insights that will enrich the frame-
work by providing input from another perspective, so that assumptions such as
rationality can be revisited. It has been conceded that the framework needs to
be updated to take into account irrational behaviour in various contexts, such
as the effectiveness of the tactics of con artist []. As has been said previously,
the information security fields also has a lot to gain by looking at the problem
of mimicry. Even if the assumptions of the framework need some polishing [],
its perspective is thought to offer valuable insights. ese can provide ideas that
may lead to new solution or the improvement of old ones.
1.2 Terminology
Trust is the action or willingness of the truster to make themselves vulnerable
in the face of uncertain payoffs of the trustee: if the trustee is honest then trust
pays, but if their trust is betrayed theywould have done better by not trusting [].
Mimicry is the deliberate display of a perceivable property (manifestum) by an
entity that wants to be taken as the possessor of a non-visible property (krypton)

of another entity while not actually possessing this property [, , ]. A creden-
tial is evidence of one’s characteristics, such as authority, background, identity,
or predispositions [, ]. Authentication is the checking of credentials before
deciding on some action [, , ].is often takes the formof verifying claims
about identity, origin, or correctness. Access control consists of the authentica-
tion of entities and determining whether they are allowed access to assets based
on some policy [, ].
e topic of this project is mimicry during authentication, which consists of
two problems: the possibility of the authenticater or the authenticatee not being
who they claim to be. Although all authentication is taken to consist of observing
credentials, not all observation of credentials consists of authentication, since
mimicsmay be at the receiving end of a communication of credentials. Similarly,
when a credential is communicated this may not be rock solid evidence of being
an authentic entity, since the entity may be vulnerable to mimicry. Identifying
how to deal with these two problems is the goal of this project, with phishing as
focal point of the investigation.
e definition of phishing is contested, with some sources defining it as any
form of pilfering of user information [, , ], while other employ a more
narrow definition limited to the vectors of email and websites []. ere is also
confusion about the relationship between pharming and phishing [, ]. An-
other issue is the use of cheesy terminology such as ‘phish’ []: continuing this
trend would mean victims of pharming are ‘phegetables’. Even though there is all
this confusionwewill continue to use the term phishing for the sake of backward
compatibility. Phishing is taken to be a double dose of mimicry during authenti-
cation: both the sender of the email and the publisher of the website are not who
they claim to be.
1.3 Examples
In order to provide a more down to earth explanation and to contextualise the
definitions in the previous subsection it seems helpful to provide a few scenarios
to better explain the terms.
When users read their email they cannot be expected to have a thorough un-
derstanding of the risks they face. ey engage in trust behaviour, by looking for
signs that show that the email comes from a valid receiver. One credential is the
presence of an email address that users recognise. is credential can be mim-
icked by an imposted by spoofing the email address. If a user received an email
asking for some information the user would authenticate the sender of the email
based on various credentials of the email, and engage in access control to deter-
mine whether the entity has access to the information. On top of trust strategies,

whereby users decide whether to make themselves vulnerable or not in the face
of certain benefits, they engage in riskmanagement, namely the selective sharing
of their email address and the use of spam filters.
People’s password policies show that they employ both riskmanagement and
trust strategies. Examples of risk management are evaluating how strong a pass-
word needs to be and deciding whether or not it is safe enough to write a pass-
word down.When sharing passwords users seem to engage in trust behaviour for
various reasons, ranging from efficiency to sociability []. Research has shown
that users tend to share their passwords with coworkers as well as people out-
side the company [].When choosing to share a password the credentials take
the form of signals mediating the characteristics of years at the company, help-
fulness, administrative role, previous interaction, and others. Mimics can dis-
play these credentials as well, and social engineering attacks leading to password
compromise have been widely reported. After authenticating the credentials the
users will engage in access control of their passwords, and will decide what pass-
words to share with the other entity.
1.4 Objectives
e objectives of this project are to
• put the study of mimicry on the information security research map;
• compile the theories of Gambetta about mimicry;
• evaluate the current state of phishing research;
• describe existing models of phishing and their relevance;
• show the relevance of Gambetta’s theories to the phishing problem;
• test their usefulness by applying them to information security issues;
• discuss the ethical dilemmas surrounding credentials;
• make testable predictions based on the covered theory; and
• sketch a roadmap for further research into mimicry.
1.5 Overview
e layout of this paper follows the objectives that are defined in the previous
subsection. e next section is a theoretical look at trust, mimicry, and creden-
tials. A literature study of phishing research, including a description and critique

of existing models is the focus of the second section. Another section is ded-
icated to the relevance of Gambetta’s theories. Following this is a section that
combines theory and practice by looking for solutions to current problems. A
section discussing the ethical dimension of credentials is also provided. Guid-
ance for practitioners and a roadmap for future research conclude the paper.

2 Trust, Mimicry, and Credentials
In this section the theories of Diego Gambetta pertaining to trust and mimicry
are described. e material here is based on work describing [] and extending
[] the theoretical framework, and two ethnographic studies of taxi drivers []
and criminals [] that test the framework. Because divergent terminology is
used in these works for the same concepts, it was thought appropriate to discuss
the framework using a coherent terminology.e goal of this section is to explain
Gambetta’s theories. A critique and possible improvements are saved for a later
section, before which a thorough investigation of phishing is completed, so that
the evaluation has something to build on. e main source of information is the
original article [] where the frameworkwas first proposed, and this is the source
of the material in this section unless noted otherwise.
2.1 Basic Trust Games
Gambetta and Bacharach built a framework for describing and evaluating trust
decisions, based on certain assumptions. ey take actors to be rational entities,
and assume that all choices are decomposable into constituent decisions, whose
outcome can be evaluated using game theoretic (win/lose) logic. ese assump-
tions come from the origins of the theory, which are game theory and signalling
theory. e theory portrays trust as a game of asymmetric information, with the
pay-offs for breaking trust unknown to the truster, but known to the trustee. Raw
and all-in payoffs are proposed, with the raw payoffs representing the rewards
for the players not taking into account any contextual and historical factors such
as their upbringing or future expectations. All-in payoffs are those that take into
account any correcting factors. Raw payoffs are assumed to be known to all play-
ers, while not all all-in payoffs are. For an example trust game see figure .
Gambetta and Bacharach see trust as trusting someone to do something (and
thus also the corollary, trusting someone not do so something). is perspec-
tive is argued to capture many trust scenarios, although it isn’t designed for the
analysis of every kind of trust. Trusting someone to do something is defined as
acting under the expectation that the other will do what is asked of them, and
both individuals are aware that when the trustee fails to do this something, the
truster would have been better off not trusting the person, and both also know
that the truster acting in the way they do will give the trustee a (selfish) reason to
betray the truster (to not do that something). A more precise description of this
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α 3, 2 −3,−4
ᾱ 0, 0 0, 0
All-in payoffs
Figure : Example of raw and all-in payoffs, adapted from [, ]
⟨α,β⟩R > ⟨ᾱ,β⟩R ()
⟨α, β̄⟩R < ⟨ᾱ, β̄⟩R ()
α :
{
β < β̄ for selfish payoffs
β <> β̄ for all-in payoffs
()
ᾱ : . . . ()
β : α > ᾱ ()
β̄ : α < ᾱ ()

e basic trust game consists of two players, the truster R and the trustee
E, both with two strategies α and ᾱ, and β and β̄ respectively. e payoffs for
the players are represented by two payoff matrices, one for the ‘raw’ payoffs that
are motivated by self-interest, and another for the ‘all-in’ payoffs that include
things like ethics, upbringing, morals. Many other payoff matrices are possible,
but Gambetta and Bacharach have chosen to simplify it to just two for simplic-
ity’s sake. e assumptions about the knowledge of the players are that both R
and E know about the possible strategies (α, ᾱ, β, β̄), that both players know R’s
raw and all-in payoffs, and that normally only E would know E’s all-in payoffs,
although both players know E’s raw payoffs. e game is thus one of asymmetric
information about E’s payoffs.
Gambetta and Bacharach identify two problems with the above formalisa-
tion of trust. Firstly, selfish payoffs may not be selfish at all, for example, when
someone donates to charity instead of paying off a loan.e argument for calling
one of the payoff matrices selfish is for simplicity’s sake. Secondly, the basic trust
game only includes one peril (β̄). However, at the cost of additional complexity
it can be extended to includemultiple perils (β1,β2, ...). It may be noted that one
could move even further to also include multiple profit and loss scenarios for R,
by enabling multiple trusting choices of R, as well as increasing the number of
positive actions of E.
Figure  is an example of possible payoff matrices. e exact values of the
numbers are not important, since they are purely illustrative. It onlymatters that
equations  and  for the payoffs of R under the given strategies are correct for
both matrices, and that equations  to  are are satisfied. is ensures that Rwill
prefer strategy β (trusting act) when E is expected to choose β (trusted-in act),
but would have done better not to trust (ᾱ) when their trust is betrayed (β̄). E is
trustworthy if E chooses β, believing R trusts them. An assumption is that all-in
payoffs govern choice, thus for E to be trustworthy their all-in payoffs must be
different from their raw payoffs. If R thinks E is trustworthy, E thinks R trusts
them, and R has all-in payoffs favouring strategy β, situation will appear where
R trusts E and does α, and E thinks they are trusted and does β.
Trust-warranting properties seem to be present inmost situations.ere are
many possible properties that can make a trustee trustworthy. ese can be E’s
reasons to choose β or their preference for the ⟨α,β⟩ outcome. e choice for β
over β̄ can be a conscious or subconscious mechanisms, and the value attached
to ⟨α,β⟩ can result from dispositions, norms, or morals. e trust-warranting
properties of an individual transform their raw payoffs, replacing them by all-in
payoffs. Raw payoffs can be seen as first-order payoffs, with all-in payoffs being
of a higher order.

2.2 Mimic-Beset Trust Games
Gambetta and Bacharach identify two trust problems, the first-order trust prob-
lem and the second-order trust problem.e first-order trust problem is the un-
certainty of the truster (R) over the payoffs of the trustee (E). Trust would not be
necessary if all payoffs were known. e uncertainty over the payoffs leads R to
look for signals that mediate trust-warranting properties. While all raw payoffs
are assumed to be known to both parties, R does not know the all-in payoffs of
E. e first-order trust problem is R’s uncertainty over E’s payoffs. All-in payoffs
are contextual, and if R can discover how the properties of E relate to this con-
text they can determine the all-in payoffs of E, and can solve the first-order trust
problem by observing E’s properties. While the discovery of these factors may
be difficult, the rest of the framework assumes they are known to the players.
Once the relevant trust-warranting properties are known to both players the
second-order trust problem appears. In this case E has the incentive to fake the
properties so that they are more likely to be trusted. is is possible because in
virtually all scenarios trust-warranting properties are unobservable, and ‘signs
mediate the knowledge of them’. Several concepts are added to the basic trust
game for discussing this finding. Krypta are unobservable properties of people,
and t-krypta are those that are trust-warranting. Manifesta are observable fea-
tures of people that may be associated with krypta and t-krypta.us, manifesta
may be signs of krypta, although their trustworthiness depends on the reliability
of the manifesta.
Mimic-beset trust games are an upgraded version of the basic trust game,
in which the knowledge of trust-warranting properties is mediated by signs and
where an opportunist is present. e opportunist is a type of interactant that is
notmerely guided by raw payoffs, but actively seeks to deceive. Amimic of kryp-
ton k, through manifestumm, ‘is a person who does not have k and deliberately
displaysm in order to be taken by another to havek’.When such a display is nega-
tive it is called camouflage. e second-order trust problem is finding manifesta
that reliably signal t-krypta, kt. When mimics are on the loose this is an im-
portant question. e problem is relevant t-krypta and krypta. When the game
involves a temporal factor the reidentification of players is important. A player’s
identity is a krypton that is mediated through the display of amanifestum, which
serves as the beacon for reidentification. In order to profit from another person’s




Gambetta and Bacharach think that primary and secondary problems of trust
often go hand-in-hand, and that the latter is often the one that needs to be solved
to take care of the former. In order to delve into the secondary problem they
recast the mimic-beset trust game into a signalling game. ey also expand the
simple signalling game to include second-order signals, namely identity.
e building blocks of signalling theory are signals and three types of players.
Signals are any actions performed by the sender of the signal that are meant to
change the receiver’s perception of the probability of a certain event. e three
player types are owners of a krypton (here K), non-owners of a krypton (here
K̄), and receivers seeking to determine which is which (here V , for verifier). It
is assumed that V will try to separate K from K̄ since responding solely to K
is though best for V . e main result of signalling theory is that a signal s can
convey a certain level of truth if is too expensive for some K̄ to display and cheap
enough for moreK. A signal can be displayed when the expected benefit exceeds
the cost. When all K’s can emit a signal and all K̄’s cannot emit a signal, a sorting
equilibrium is present since V can correctly distinguish all players. Where V ’s
predictions are correct only intermittently a semi-sorting equilibrium is present,
as is the case in most animal and human system.
Gambetta and Bacharach identify the relationship between signalling theory
and the trust problem as follows: ‘mimic-beset trust games are instances of sig-
nalling games’. ey take the display ofm to be the signalling of s, which E (K or
K̄) may or may not display. By drawing these parallels they upgrade the mimic-
beset trust game by identifying when mimics will display m. In the presence of
a semi-sorting equilibrium some K̄ display m. Signalling theory is portrayed as
‘a powerful tool’, but there is the concession that there ‘are strong assumptions
about the players’ background knowledge’. Signalling theory can can give insight
into the amount of false signalling, under the assumptions of players’ knowledge
about the cost of signals for K and K̄ and the probabilities of meeting K and K̄.
At this point the theory enables the analysis of idealised cases of informative
andmisleading rational krypton signalling.e partial and abstract nature of the
model is conceded, noting that it focuses only on cost and benefits, neglecting
any surrounding structure or explanation.e rest of Gambetta and Bacharach’s
paper [] makes improvement to the framework to provide a more complete
theory. ese are the introduction of identity and sign management practices.

2.4 Identity Signalling
e structure of the model up to this point is m → k → t. Manifesta (m) are
displayed, and are linked to krypta (k), which may or may not warrant trust (t).
Identity can be introduced into the model by viewing it as another krypton (i),
signalled via signatures (g), and related to other krypta (k). is four-layered in-
ferential structure is takes the form g → i → k → t. Introducing identity helps
players in multi-round games with rematching to have some level of confidence
in a player’s history. Players can build up a reputation, and can call on it by sig-
nalling signatures linked to their identity.
Gambetta and Bacharach find that identity signalling might be more effi-
cient than simple krypton signalling since it can build on previous interactions,
potentially lessening the intensity of probing. ese previous interactions create
beliefs in the mind of the truster, which can take two forms: trait laws and repu-
tations. Trait laws are descriptions of how various signals of group membership
and personal habits generalise to further encounters, without specifying exact
values for these mappings. Reputation is associated with an experience krypton:
a krypton that becomes revealed after an interaction with the possessor of the
krypton. Revealing a krypton the player lead to a reputation for either K or K̄.
Reaping the benefits of reputation requires attestation of identity, and for players
that do not engage in such signalling ‘reputation will be stillborn’. is signalling
generally takes place through the display of what Gambetta and Bacharach call
signatures: ‘a manifestum that is drawn from some fixed family, called a stock’.
Since signal corruption and the ease of mimicry increase as signatures increase
in similarity, a trustee should pick signatures from the stock in a way that gives
players unique manifesta.
Gambetta and Bacharach see identity signalling as one instantiation of a
more general maxim: to increase efficiency signallers should build on preexist-
ing beliefs linking one krypton to another, and findingwhich krypton’smanifesta
are the cheapest and most reliable signals, i.e. the more efficient ones. e g →
i → k → t structure contains only four layers, with one manifestum-krypton
link, and one krypton-krypton link. However, many more krypton-krypton lay-
ers are possible, providing even more indirect signalling mechanism.
A set of people can signal identity through a group signature. It should be
displayed by all members of the group (x), and by none of the non-members (x̄).
e advantages of sets are that the perception of having k spreads much faster
due to categorical trail laws, and groups may better at self-observance, enabling
greater compliance with trait laws. However, signals need temporal invariance
for them to be of use, which is easier for an individual to achieve than for a group.
Such coordinations become simpler in the presence of social cohesion.
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2.5 Sign Management
Gambetta and Bacharach note that although signalling theory provides a frame-
work to analyse the problem of secondary trust it is ‘abstract and incomplete’.
ey attribute this to the absence of a concrete semiotic structure in signalling
theory. ey sketch such a structure as ‘a relentless semiotic warfare’ that con-
sists of the scope ‘for creating new signs, for discovering latent one, and for pro-
tecting signs against mimicry’, as well as stratagems to get around these pro-
tective measures. eir paper closes with a discussion of how manifesta obtain
their significance, a taxonomy ofmanifesta, and techniques of signmanagement,
namely protection and selection.
Signalling theory cannot explain the mechanics the contraction of m and
its association with k, since it cannot support real-time processes. Gambetta
and Bacharach state that, while signalling theory has nothing to say about it,
in most cases ‘model comes before mimic’. Note that there is a case of rip-off
pottery design that was later adapted by the original artist [], which makes
the question of directionality a tough call, but it seems apparent that such cases
are a tiny minority. e meaning of m is seen as a temporal associative belief,
that is, m → k at time t is a function of experience krypta perceived before this
time. Signalling theory is static because it is an equilibrium theory, thus failing
to model causal relationships, and therefore cannot provide an explanation.
e taxonomy of manifesta is based the reliability of signs based on on the
can and cannot conditions. ree types of manifesta are identified: cues, sym-
bolic manifesta, and fakeable manifesta. Cues are signals that are costless to dis-
play for K, and have a non-zero cost for K̄. Automatic cues, or marks [], are
displayed subconsciously by K and impose even less of a burden. e effective-
ness of cues depends on the cost of s for K̄, and the presence of cues in K̄, and
needs to be evaluated by R. e use of technology has made visible some cues,
while others are the result of evolutionary pressure. Symbolicmanifesta are those
m that ‘consist of a configuration of characters, however these may be physically
realised’, e.g. names and logos. A disadvantage is that they are very easy to copy,
while an advantage is that they are cheap to display. eir evidential value is
decreased because of the threat of copying, and Gambetta and Bacharach find
that ‘the expansion of the scope for ultra-cheap transmission of symbol-strings is
indeed a major cause of the growth of mimicry in our time’. Still, symbols are of-
ten used in identity signalling, with various sign management strategies in place
that increase the cost of mimicry. Fakeable manifesta are not true manifesta but
‘quasi manifesta’ whereby only of the part of the object is observable. Fakeable
object can be replaced by another one with the same observable component. An
example of a fakeable object is a college certificate.

e protection of signals takes place by changing the can and cannot con-
ditions of the signs. Often the cannot condition fails, and protection need to be
introduced that deters potential mimics from producing or displaying the signal.
Such a strategymust be affordable toK, else the can condition is not satisfied.e
total cost of producing, displaying, and protecting a sign should not be too high.
It is possible to choose alternative manifesta that are difficult to mimic, but this
may be too expensive. A common strategy is to combine cheap manifesta with
strong protection. e protection strategy can build on catching mimics in the
act or on subsequent prosecution and punishment, and it can be implemented
by the truster, the model, or a coalition of the two. ese protection strategies
are illustrated in the empirical study of criminal communication [].
Choosing the correct signs to use is as important as protecting them, and
it often involves searching or designing new signals. e model, or trustworthy
trustee, can often raise the cost of mimicry bymakingmanifesta more expensive
to display or by choosing employing new manifesta. When the model is able to
switch to costlier signals at low enough cost the threat of mimicry can be dealt
with. Often the adjustment of one manifestum is enough to increase the diffi-
culty of mimicry. Another technique for defending against mimicry is creating a
constellation ofmanifesta, since the coordination cost goes up asmoremanifesta
need to be displayed.
2.6 Mimicry Systems
e paper [] by Gambetta that updates the framework provides a more high-
level overview of the framework than the  paper. Besides a few changes in
the taxonomy of signs the main addition is a description of various mimicry sys-
tems. is update and the applications [, ] of the framework show a move
away from game theoretic formalisms towards a more liberal and higher-level
conception. In a review [] of the ethnographic study of criminal communi-
cation it was found that many of the findings remained to be integrated into
fundamental game theoretic models. is explains the current high-level focus
of the framework.
e mimicry systems that are identified are ‘mimic versus dupe via model’,
‘mimic versus model via a dupe’, and ‘mimic versus dupe-model’. In the first the
mimic has no conflict with the model but uses its appearance to harm the dupe.
e second employs seeks to fool the dupe in an effort to harm the model. In the
last the model and the dupe are of the same kind, for example passing oneself off
as a police officer among police.
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2.7 Applicability
In a simple analysis of several case studies the framework was found to be ap-
plicable. It pictures the problem of trust not as one where the truster needs to
determine what properties make the trustee trustworthy, but instead involves
the decoding of signs in a creaseless semiotic warfare with mimics.
An ethnographic study [] of the trusting behaviours of taxi drivers in New
York and Belfast found that while taxi drivers generally approach the problem
through simple risk acceptance, they are always aware of the issues and they
started to approach the problem as one of trust when they found that some-
thing did not feel right. e decisions made by the taxi drivers were evident of a
high level of reasoning as predicted by the framework. However, Gambetta and
Hamill did not investigate whether this was a result of self-selection of learning
on the job.
e ethnographic study [] of the communication of criminals found that
criminals find it difficult to communicate their trustworthiness to other crimi-
nals due to the nature of their profession. In order to enable collaboration with
other criminals they need to show in some way that they can be expected to
keep their side of the bargain. Once tactic for this was found to be the exchange
of hostages in the form of information about previous crimes. e way that the
trust problem is dealt with is through making the trust-warranting properties
close to irrelevant, by creating the proper contextual factors. is elucidates the
differences between risk management and trust. Risk management, and in par-
ticular assurance, can be described as ameans of dealing with uncertainty by im-
plementing countermeasures. In the case of trust decisions this uncertainty is the
unknown trust-warranting properties. However, even if countermeasures have
been put in place an individual still has to trust in signals that show this. Mea-
sures such as auditing and information hostages create proxy signals, in which
trust is needed. us, the level of trusting is shifted to another level.
e relevance of the framework to the ethnographic studies may be due to
the high stakes that the players are in for. In both cases they put their life at risk.
Whether the framework also applies in less life threatening situation is some-
thing that needs to be investigated. is is done by dipping into the phishing
literature. However, first the relation of the framework to problems of mimicry
during authentication is described.
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2.8 Mimicry during Authentication
Going by the framework of Gambetta, authentication is seen as a trust decision.
e authenticater is the truster and the authenticatee is the trustee, and the pur-
pose of the authentication is to observe credentials of trustee that provide infor-
mation about their characteristics. Note that credentials take the same role as
signals, and characteristics are equal to krypta. If the problem of mimicry can be
solved then the problem comes down to access control, whereby the character-
istics of the user determine what assets are allowed to access.
It is interesting to look at cryptography from the perspective of the frame-
work. Cryptography creates symbolic signals but still allows for strongly discrim-
inatory signals. It does not make the copying or display of signs prohibitively ex-
pensive, but instead addresses the creation of signs, which is something not ad-
dressed by Gambetta. e keys can be said to be the krypta of the trustee. Since
management assigned these krypta to users this allows them to link it to other
krypta. Looking at a run of a cryptographic protocol it becomes clear that, pro-
vided a challenge-response protocol is used, the signal does not depend merely
on the krypta of the user, but also on the environment. Protocols provide tem-
poral links and boundary conditions, and create a context for sign creation.
To show the relevance of Gambetta’s framework to information security, an
example of how it fits into online services is helpful. We will consider phishing
and the traditionalMITMattack here. Amore thorough analysis and application
of the framework is provided after the section on phishing research.
In anMITM attack the attacker engages in two parallel mimicry runs: the at-
tacker mimics the client to the server and the attacker mimics the server to the
client. Credentials of the user are traditionally just their passwords, and those
of the server the use of their secret key couple to a certificate. Alternative cre-
dentials that may offer some degree of discrimination between genuine entities
and mimics are the location from which the user appears to connect, the appar-
ent location of the server, and SSL protected locally stored cookie linked to the
relevant webpage.
Phishing consists of themimicry of the sender of themessage and themimicry
of the publisher of the website, which happens serially.e credentials that users
look for in an email range from the sender’s email address to the accuracy of the
spelling. ese are not perfect in their ability to filter out phishing emails, but
they do distinguish them to a certain degree. When authenticating the website
many users focus on the appearance of the website, and check whether the URL
is plausible. Again, these are not perfect but they do filter out some mimics.
While these examples show that some of Gambetta’s assumptions may not
hold, they also indicate the potential of a sociological view of authentication.
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3 Phishing
e feasibility of the framework described in the previous section is tested by
looking at the problem of phishing. is section will provide an overview of the
current phishing literature, and the next section will see how well these findings
match with the framework. e topics that are covered here are phishing statis-
tics, or the lack thereof, various findings with respect to fighting phishing, and
the theoretical frameworks that currently exist to explain phishing. e main
ways in which phishing is being addressed are better user education, designing
systems that are easier to use, constructing systems that are more secure by de-
fault, detecting phishing emails and websites, taking down of phishing websites,
and discovering of new attack methods. e following subsections will provide
an overview of these aspect, and the remaining problems.
3.1 Statistics
Phishing attacks can cause emotional and monetary harm. However, accurate
quantitative information is hard to come by. e actors involved in the fight
against phishing seek to portray themselves in a positive light, leading to bi-
ased results [].e number of URLs, domains, and hosts can be interpreted in
multiple ways, monetary losses may be the result of activities other than phish-
ing, gangs are not as clear-cur as they appear to be, monetary damage is lim-
ited through recovery efforts, and measurements of take-down time depends on
who is asked. Although it can be said that attaching numbers to crimes is diffi-
cult, phishing statistics are easily manipulated by interested parties. Data from
the Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG) [] and the UK Cards Association
(UKCA) [] illustrate the difficulty of evaluating the phishing problem. ese
are shown in table , and indicate the disparity between the results of the two
organisations. e contradictory trends could be an effect of different focus, but
as [] notes, they may be the result of personal interests. Banks like portray-
ing themselves as effective fighters of phishing, by pumping up the number of
attacks and playing down any damages. APWG receives it’s numbers from in-
dustry feeds, which may be influenced by paying customers. It seems that the
phishing industry is in an ugly political tangle.
In order to better address the problem of phishing more accurate statistics
are needed. Without such numbers it will be difficult to know whether counter-
measures are working. Before pumpingmoney into systems that may ormay not
work, companies, governments, and individuals need a way to evaluate the per-
formance of such tools. Further research should focus on finding reliable ways






Table : Number of phishing attacks from  to 
3.2 Training
e work on user education is not very rosy. One problem with user education
is the large percentage () of popular websites that use confusing indicators
[]. ey have http pages with https forms, lock icons as favicons, hidden lo-
cation bars, mismatched domain names, or complicated URLs. rough daily
use of the Internet users are being educated to ignore security indicators. Re-
search into new ways of displaying these indicators is needed. However, making
users respond to indicators is one thing, they also need to known the meaning
of such indicators. Research evaluating connection security found that people
have wrong conceptions []. ese conceptions were not always more accu-
rate in participants with a technological background. rough interviews, ex-
periments, and having users draw their perception of security it was found that
users think that there is a ‘place’ that needs to be made secure, e.g. the lock area.
Such research can help designers and educators find themisconception of users,
although this is only the first step in finding a solution to the problem.Users need
to be taught to look at security indicators and they need to understand what they
mean.
Some effort has gone into the design of training systems that build on in-
sights from learning theory []. Two such systems are PhishGuru and Anti-
Phishing Phil. PhishGuru works by sending users periodic training emails that
lead them to a comic tutorial if they fall for the email, and Anti-Phishing Phil is
a game where people eat worms that represent URLs. e systems were found
to be about as effective as traditional methods, provided that people actually
read them. Whether the effectiveness of the two systems was due to the novelty
factor or the design is not clear, and worthy of further research. e results do
indicate that testing education systems in a natural setting is of utmost impor-
tance: when testing the effectiveness of anti-phishing education validity needs to
ensured. Traditionally the focus of testing the effectiveness of anti-phishing ed-
ucation has been on student populations, whichmake generalisation to business
users problematic []. Another issue is that role-playing users act less securely
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than when the use their own passwords []. Pushing out education packages
that haven’t been thoroughly tested is not constructive. More fruitful is testing
the effectiveness of publicly available training material, and finding ways to use
these most effectively []. One side of the coin is designing effective training
methods, another is developing general guidelines for appropriate anti-phishing
education.
e problems with user training are adapting to changes in technology, the
constant need to keep educating users, expense issues, and questions of effec-
tiveness. Most phishing education does not reach levels that can be called ‘safe’
[]. As such, other avenues for dealing with the problem should be explored.
is does not mean that education should be abandoned, but it does mean that
it cannot be the sole solution to the problem.
3.3 Usability
It has been argued that ‘users are not the enemy’ but that designers which don’t
understand how their systems are used in practice are []. An example is the ef-
fectiveness of password policies, which fail when they do not take into account
the needs and limitations of users. e needs of the user should be at the centre
of security design []. However, the knowledge of users is often limited as is
their motivation. Designers need to take this into account when designing sys-
tems. It is important to understand the psychology of the user, and to evaluate
various possible solutions for the phishing problem []. Looking at the technical
side of the problem is not enough, and more attention is needed for the human
side of the problem. One experiment that measured users’ abilities found that
users are not suspicious of personalised messages, wellformed URLs with sim-
ilar semantic meaning, and phone calls []. Another study found that even in
conditions where users expect spoofed webpages a large percentage cannot dis-
tinguish phishing websites from legitimate websites []. Indicators were poorly
understood, not well noticed, and easy to spoof. e problem of phishing should
not be approached from a cryptographic angle but from a usability perspective.
More work is necessary in studying users in a naturalistic settings, as well as
investigations into the role of education versus usability.
Several approaches to make systems easier to use have been proposed in
the literature. Visual hashes are described as the basis of a solution for certifi-
cate verification and authentication via image recognition, since humans are
bad at checking random strings and cannot remember strong passwords [].
To make online password entry more secure a verified password windows has
been proposed that builds upon a personalised background image as a security
skin, which is thought to make website authentication easier for the user [].
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Various passport management systems have been built, such as the browser ex-
tensions Passpet [] and Web Wallet [], which simplify proper password
policies.
While efforts tomake systemsmore usable are commendable, in general try-
ing to increase the usability of a system can be problematic because it takes a lot
of time and effort, requires training of designers and engineers, and may have
problems with user take-up. Nonetheless, a helpful guiding principle is making
an effort to reduce the schism between the designer’s and user’s interpretation
of the workings of a system [].
3.4 Security by Default
Systems can be designed to be secure by being usable, but they can also be de-
signed to be secure by default. In online scenarios this means that a reliable path
needs to be created between the server and the user.e path between the server
and the browser is relatively secure, with the path between the browser and the
user needed most work. To create a reliable path between the browser and the
user the interface needs to be designed in such a way that information is correct
and unspoofable []. Anti-phishing systems that are secure by default are not
widely implemented, but various solutions have been designed. Some of these
rely on significant changes to the operation of the browser, while others seek
only minor adjustments.
One mechanism for creating a reliable path is using a second browser that
employs protected linkswhich are signed by providers that have to bewhitelisted
[]. Interaction happens in a stripped down browser interface that is uncon-
nected to the normal browser. While this solves the problem, when new appli-
cations can be installed the use of dedicated applicationsmay bemore advisable,
as is currently happening in the tablet and smartphone ecosystem. Another pro-
posal is the use of a secure device that communicates with the browser []. e
device and the server share a secret that is used to authenticate the phone, and
a secure bookmark on the phone serves to authentication the server. e issues
here are the security of the phone, the likelihood of adoption, and the effective-
ness with respect to fraud reduction across the board.
In order to defeat keyloggers an on-screen keyboardhas beenproposed [],
but it is still vulnerable to screen capturemalware.Another anti-malwaremethod
based on tracking the intentions of users over time to build a user-intention
based access control policies [] seems relevant to fighting phishing: it could
protect users based on automatically setting boundaries building on normal user
behaviour. e effectiveness of such an approach depends the willingness of de-
signers to implement it, as well as user acceptance of such a system. A less drastic
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change is the implementation of a strong locked same origin policy for browsers.
Using such an approach it is possible to achieve provably secure cookie-based
authentication protocols by employing a cookie that signals a site’s identity to
the user []. is assumes secure hardware and software, as well as the user’s
ability to distinguish the cookie signals. Work on these assumptions is needed.
e broad question with respect to designing security into the system is
the relationship between innovation and control, and the limitations of secu-
rity. Carefully designed and controlled systems tend to be easier to secure. e
distributed nature of the Internet, and the different incentives of a broad range
of actors, make a common solution difficult. Still, the call [] to decrease the
reliance on the user’s operation of the system is a welcome one.
3.5 Detection
From the preceding subsections it becomes that many users cannot be expected
to correctly authenticate websites. One way to deal with the problem is having
the system detect suspicious emails and websites so that the user doesn’t have to.
Many different detectionmethods have been proposed, which differwith respect
to their algorithms, heuristics, data sources, and location within the network.
Common locations for filters are the organisation’s proxy and the user’s browser.
Filters can be place on the user’s computer or on a server. Filters can be placed
on the user’s computer or somewhere on the network, such as a company proxy
system.Today all the recent browsers have some formof anti-phishing capability.
In a test of a large range of browser-based anti-phishing tools it was found
that their effectiveness varies greatly, with many vulnerable to simple exploits
[]. A combination of heuristics and blacklists was recommended for future
tools. Heuristics can be used to calculate risk scores, based on factors such as
domain lifetime, domain age, location, and domain search ranking []. e is-
sue with heuristics is that they may lead to too many false positives or negatives,
while blacklists do not deal with zero-hour phishing websites. A system based
on content analysis and simple heuristic, using the TF-IDF frequency algorithm
to derive search terms that are used to check whether the website comes up suf-
ficiently high in search engine ranking, was found to have a decent detection
rate, although language issues and obfuscation need to be addressed []. An-
other system uses this same technique, coupled with whitelists, human-verified
blacklists, and the shingling method allowing similarity detection, giving a sys-
tem based on a potpourri of techniques that leads to reasonable true positive
rates and very low false positive rates []. Research has shown that there is po-
tential for adding a wide variety of machine learning methods to anti-phishing
tools []. A notable unorthodox method is the offence-centric anti-phishing
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technique that builds on a list of fake usernames, and interrogates the website to
check for accurate responses []. Although CAPTCHAs would prevent such a
tactic, they are not currently deployed.
Network based anti-phishing filters are not as common as host-based filters.
One such system is an institution-wide, two-stage email filter based on intrusion
detection methods []. It filters emails and then crawls the phishing website to
check whether the content matches that of sites that are the target of imperson-
ation. By being server-basedmore uniform enforcement and updating are possi-
ble, although such approaches aremore difficult in consumer systems. For heavy
load systems more lightweight mechanisms may be needed. Efficient blocking
of phishing emails can take place using simple heuristics such as the presence
of host obfuscation [], although phisher may be quick to adapt to such mea-
sures. An alternative to outright blocking is installing a sanitising proxy system,
which works by checking for suspicious websites, and stripping all content from
insecure webpages what may allow users to submit information []. is may
be more effective in teaching users about the dangers of phishing websites, al-
though this need further investigation.
While a wide variety detectionmethodologies have been proposed, and con-
tinue to be proposed, they also keep getting subverted. It is important for anti-
phishing schemes to not just withstand current attacks, but to be designed with
an eye for the future []. Research looking at web malware delivery found that
attackers are quick to adapt []. Asmore andmore countermeasures are adopted
against phishing attacks the ingenuity of attacks can be expected to rise. In or-
der to prevent an expensive game of incremental security improvements where
designers are always on the defensive, designers need to sidestep the arms race
by a sudden extensive increase in anti-phishing technology []. However, many
users may not have access to accurate filters, or these may be subverted through
spearphishing attacks, and as such alternative means to fight phishing should
not be neglected.
3.6 Takedown
Although takedown is often perceived as as a game of whack-a-mole, research
has shown that it does reduce damages, even if the removal happens slowly [].
Because there is a window between phishing pages going live and being taking
down, takedown is only part of the solution. Some service providers were found
to have a faster response than others and some brands aremore successful in fast
takedown. It seems that for the larger part the effectiveness of takedowndoes not
depend on the technologies used by phishers (such as fast-flux networks), but
instead is determined by how the responsibility for issuing takedown request is
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distributed and what the incentives are for organisations to allocate appropriate
resources for getting websites removed []. Legal frameworks, content types,
and attack methods were found to have limited impact on takedown speed. For
example, the takedown speed of child pornography is extremely slow because
the responsibilities are divided over national boundaries, even though it has been
universally criminalised. Fast-fluxwas found to play less of a role than incentives,
looking at the long life of online pharmacies versus the short life of phishing
websites.
When researching phishing various ethical dilemmas pop up []. In take-
down research the questions are: do researchers have a reporting duty, should
they notify victims, is it permissible to fabricate content to conduct ‘pure’ experi-
ments (notmerely observational experiments), should researchers collectworld-
readable data, how should criminals deal with the potential assisting of criminals
with their analysis, should the investigatory technique be revealed (there is a sci-
entific need for repetition but there may be a need to keep things secret which
may hamper publication), when should data sets bemade public (greater knowl-
edge sharing, but also with phishers) or kept secret, is the fix realistic and does it
consider the incentives of the participants (the market can be a beast), and what
if the fix is worse than the problem (e.g. how does it impact free and open soci-
ety)? Although more information is necessary about how victim selection takes
place and how phishing websites could be disrupted [], research needs to take
placewithin an ethical framework.Unfortunately such a framework still needs to
be agreed on. While the ethical issues have not been hammered out alternative
methods may need to be investigated, such as poisoning the databases of phish-
ers with fake fingerprinted credentials, which are used to observe their actions
once they use these to login at which point they are directed to a phoneypot [].
e effectiveness of takedown has been identified in fighting phishing. How-
ever, better incentive structures may be needed to decrease takedown time fur-
ther. Effective research into takedown, and phishing in general, is hampered not
just by ethical issues, but by the unclarity regarding these issues. More thorough
online research into takedown will require both clear guidelines as well as inno-
vative research methods.
3.7 Attacks
Much of the research into phishing has been directed at methods to fight phish-
ing. A smaller amount of effort has gone into discovering new kinds of phish-
ing attacks. While this can be argued to help with timely implementation of
countermeasures is tantamount to opening Pandora’s box. e debate over full-
disclosure has been raging for a long time, and camps have formed on both sides
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of the rift. As with the issue of full-disclosure the question of morality probably
needs to be analysed individually, since contextual factors play a big role. An-
other aspect that descriptions of phishing attacks need to deal with is the balance
between malicious use of information and the legitimate academic inquiry.
Detailed coverage about various ways in which phishing attacks can be car-
ried out are available []. ose looking for good examples of phishing web-
sites can visit PhishTank (www.phishtank.com), a collaborative clearing house
for phishing websites. Descriptions of the general tactics of phishers are widely
available, as are more advanced attacks. Academic papers have been published
that detail DNS cache poisoning attack on anti-phishing tools [] and ‘social
phishing’ attacks that makes use of social network information for personalising
messages [], among others. A distributed phishing attack has been described
whereby the location of sites hosting the content is personalised per-victim [].
is limits the effectiveness of takedown, which is argued to be the most effec-
tive defence today. e attack utilises cryptovirology, public key steganography,
and covert broadcasts for later reconnaissance by the phishers, by having the
cryptotrojan publish the loot on bulletin boards. A solution has been presented
which requires client-side ISP to block fraudulent web hosts []. General tac-
tics, such as the effectiveness of using search engines for compromising and re-
compromising host [], have also been described in academic papers.
Generally academics publish attacks together with proposed countermea-
sures. However, such countermeasures may not be achievable by everyone af-
fected by an attack. Also, attacks can be published with different levels of de-
tail and ethical involvement. Efforts to improve online security are laudable, but
there is a big difference between raising the potential of denial of service attacks
of information visualisation tools [] and describing and carrying out a phish-
ing attack []. Analysing a system from the point of view of an attacker can
provide valuable guidance in making systems more robust, but care needs to be
taken that such forays do not result in excessive adverse impacts.
3.8 Analysis
eanalysis of phishing phenomena takes three forms: real-world investigations,
computer models, and theoretical frameworks.
ere have been investigations into howphishers operate, finding that phish-
ers may host websites on residential machines, use free services such as hosting
URL shorteners, and that the structure of phishing URLs differs from the aver-
age legitimate URL []. e market for phishing has been analysed, and found
to be have a low barrier of entry and low regeneration capacity, leading to the
problem of the tragedy of the commons []. Payoffs for most phishers decrease
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until they payoff of each phisher is equal to their opportunity cost, giving low
skill, low reward business, the impact of which has been overestimated because
mythical numbers have a tendency to be repeated when there are forces at play
that benefit from the exaggerated perception and no actors with an interest in
accurate numbers. When analysing the problem of phishing it can be helpful to
look at the problem in terms of protocols []. is can show simple changes
that make the job of phishers much more difficult. Another important aspect is
to know the purpose for which authentication takes place, otherwise reasoning
about proper authentication mechanisms is impossible [].
e distributed nature of the Internet makes microeconomic analysis and
game-theoretic analysis as important as protocol analysis and cryptanalysis [].
ere is a need to understand the economic incentives of layers for a better un-
derstanding of cybercrime. Various computer models have been let loose on the
problem of phishing. An analysis of the tactics of malware cleanup found that
a coordinated response by top players is more effective than a larger random
selection of agents []. A model of security decisions with respect to security
investments showed that central planner led security investments were not al-
ways higher than those due to individual choice []. In an evaluation of the
effect of information policies on users found that expert users never provide a
positive improvement to system-wide security, and that benevolent agents are
needed for strong security []. Observations of predicted and actual user be-
haviour found that traditional weakest-link games differ from weakest-link se-
curity games, which shows that care should be takenwhen applyingmodels from
another discipline [].
ere are only five theoretical models of phishing. ese will be shortly de-
scribed here. A more general model of trust in information security will also be
covered, since it is the only one that takes inspiration from the work of Gam-
betta, but even then it does not get to the core of the matter. e claimed goal
of many of these models is to provide a structure in which to understand the
findings of other research, and to enable quicker integration of new results.
A graph-based model very similar to a generic attack tree (e.g. see []) has
been proposed as a way of reasoning about phishing attacks []. Pieces of in-
formation and equipment are represented as vertices, and the means to get at
them as edges. An attacker starts at one vertex, and needs to traverse the graph
to another specified vertex to succeed.e contribution of themodel is the iden-
tification of linked graphs between multiple people, which allow contextualised
attacks, as a result of the connectivity of credentials. e model was used to de-
rive and test a phishing attack on eBay. e limitation of the model are the ab-
sence of any dynamics in the graph, and lack of an overarching theory. Network
theory [] may be a way to address these points.

Most trust research focusses on making people more trusting, guided by
marketing interest, not enabling better trust decisions. Previous papers focus
on trust-warranting properties, and do not take into account the possibility of
mimicry. A signalling theoretic model has been described that explains trust as
characterised by signals mediating underlying variable and malicious entities
that seek to manipulate these []. Signalling theory is seen as a framework that
can provide helpful insights into situations marred by incomplete information,
although the authors do not support the rationality assumptions of signalling
theory. e focus of the associated research is the difference between experts
and non-experts. Attackers are entities that can influence signals. Signals are the
information available to users, which can be informative about the state of the
world or not. Experts are expected to have better perception of signals withmore
meaningful signals and less misleading and missed signals. A problem with the
application of the framework is that it focusses too much on the a binary notion
of expertise. Interviews only give a perspective of the practices experts preach,
not those that they engage in. Mistakes made by users with more expertise may
be just as intriguing as thosemade by unexperienced users. Another limitation is
that the spoofing of signals is misrepresented, since it does not consist of control
of signals by an attacker, but the sending of different ones. Interestingly enough
this model does not build on the theories of Gambetta, which would enrich the
framework.
A user-phishing interactionmodel has been described that looks at the prob-
lemof phishing from the perspective of decisionmaking []. It is used in analysing
how users detect attack and where they fail. e observations that the authors
make are: more focus should be placed on designing the initial communications
since this is where users pay most attention and are most suspicious: design-
ers should identify the chance of the information they display being spoofed and
think of avenues for dealingwith these vulnerabilities, and user education should
emphasise perception over detection, since this is where most problems appear
to be, such that users should be educated in selecting the appropriate informa-
tion in different contexts, interpreting the selected information, and developing
a better feeling of what to expect from the interaction with the computer. Other
observations are that the mismatch between users’ mental models and actual
implementations needs to be decomposed further to enable useful analysis. e
construction of perception suggests two mismatches: the perceived participant
not being the actual participant, and the perceived consequences not being the
actual consequences. e inability to discover mismatches often has it’s roots
in the formation of false perception. often the problem is not that the victim’s
actions are not rational, but that they build on a wrong view of the situation
and the solving of the wrong problem. It is noted that: ‘the victim’s response is
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flawlessly rational according to the perception’. the formation of a false percep-
tion is identified to be the result of: selecting insufficient (meta) information to
construct an actual perception, incorrect interpretation of the selected informa-
tion, and inaccurate expectations leading to biased information selection. e
assumption is that attackers can only directly affect the information displayed
by the user interface. is may be a very dangerous assumption, and shows the
importance of keeping good track of the assumptions made in a model, and the
need to continuously reevaluate them. Attackers could change the environment
of a user.
Subverting the user is not studied as extensively as subverting the system, al-
though they often play a role in security compromises. A threat model has been
proposed that seeks to offer a systematic analysis of the user’s role in authenti-
cation []. It consists of three steps: describing the nature of credentials, deter-
mining the expose level of these credentials, and finding vulnerabilities of entry
points. e properties of credentials that are looked at are: mode, factor, assign-
ment, and losability. e effectiveness of passive attacks was found to depend on
the exposure of credentials to third parties, while the vulnerability to active at-
tacks depends on how likely users are to be critical when asked to present their
credentials. e model also introduced the concept of a security dependency
graph, although it is more high-level and less detailed that that in the graph-
based model []. e security of the system depends on the weakest cluster of
machines that allows reaching the target. Targets of impersonation can be ex-
ternal entities with which the user has shared credentials, or actors within the
security dependency graph. Finding vulnerabilities of entry points starts with
identifying all targets of impersonations, and is followed by determining when
credentials are exchanged or modified, these states or transitions are the entry
points.equestions to be answered are:where do transitions happen, overwhat
medium, and by whom? Once the entry points have been determined the exter-
nal entity authentication vulnerabilities are analysed, andmay be: no reliable and
sufficient authentication information provided (to users), users’ lack of knowl-
edge, and security design assumptions concerning users that do not hold in prac-
tice. To check the reliability of authentication information look at the protocol
for the credentials, identify important agents, determine the protection level of
the agents, and determine the likelihood of credential compromise. In all these
stages it is important to analyse the plausibility of assumptions made when the
system was designed. ese assumptions need to be correct to ensure a system
that is functional, and since the environment changes such assumptions need to
be regularly reevaluated. While the model can provide a good way of identifying
problems with credentials, it does not explain the social processes that underlay
authentication. An aspect that can be improved is looking at the processes that
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explain why and how credentials become socially accepted.
A behavioural model of phishing has been proposed that seeks to explain
trust behaviour as resulting from non-associative model of learning (habitua-
tion and sensitisation) and locates this behavioural activity in a broader psycho-
logical model []. In the model the establishment of trust happens through
habituation, while maintenance of trust is based on sensitisation to malevolent
events. e gradual reduction of distrust is an example of habituation, which
results from repeated harmless or beneficial exposure to a stimulus. e dis-
trust curve depends on contextual factors such as possible monetary loss, but
starts of at the maxima of distrust during the initial exchange. When trust is
broken through direct or indirect experiences the behavioural response can be
modelled using the mechanisms of sensitisation, which allows quick elimina-
tion of habituation through the presence of an aversive stimulus in place of the
expected stimulus. Sensitisation predicts that victims will redevelop trust when
provided with positive interaction. is does not work in all situations however,
since cognitive processes may take over, potentially leading to a general aversion
of the system. e challenge in security systems is encouraging processing at the
cognitive level while preventing user aversion. Humans engage in several levels
of processing, with increased extraction of meaning as processing gets deeper.
If users have become habituated, and if shallow message features appear cor-
rect, a message is more likely to be processed at the behavioural level than at
the cognitive level, and sufficient depth will not be attained. is explains why
even experienced users can become victims. To encourage processing at suffi-
cient depth the system should focus users on perceptual cues before engaging
users with behavioural responses. (On a side note it may be observed that the
focus of advertising can make this difficult.) To make sensitisation events more
effective multiple sensory inputs can be used. e mechanics of habituation and
sensitisation have been accurately fitted to real-world data in the natural world.
Several aspects of these mechanisms may be relevant to human problems. To
determine the relevance of biological principles to security decisions further ex-
periments are necessary, so that situation where habituation and sensitisation
are relevant can be determined. Also, the model needs to be extended to include
multiple parties. Because the behavioural level is just one within the psycholog-
ical stack, future work needs to look at the interplay with other layers, such as
the interaction between cognitive and behavioural processing.
e trust-warranting propertiesmodel builds onGambetta’s as a good source
of inspiration, but arguably does the exact opposite of what Gambetta sought
to do. It describes what the trust-warranting properties are from a global per-
spective, while Gambetta sought to stress that trust problems are often not the
result of the primary trust dilemma, but instead result from the secondary trust
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dilemma. It is noted that all trust is mediated by signals not muchmore than this
is covered except the note that mimicry may happen, but it is stressed that a fo-
cus on trust-warranting properties will be likely to help designers.e argument
is that the focus should not be on identifying trusted entities, but trying to design
trustworthy behaviour into the system. e attained design may not necessar-
ily be robust against well-equipped attackers, but it should enable more trusting
online communities.is approach is helpful in online communities, but should
be done in combination with looking at attacker strategies and opportunities for
impersonation.
e main insights from the models that are discussed above can be sum-
marised as follows:
• credentials can be represented on a graph, illustrating their exposure;
• analysing the nature, exposure, and entry points related to credentials can
provide a good idea of the threat;
• signalling theory can serve as a framework, while neglecting assumptions;
• user behaviour can be rational in the face of wrong perceptions;
• processing at the behavioural level can prevent more accurate analysis of
potential phishing at the cognitive level; and
• Gambetta’s framework has not yet been used in the information security
field to study the threat of phishing attacks from a mimicry perspective.
ese findings are useful when constructing other models of phishing.
eanalysis of phishers, surrounding processes, andunderlyingmechanisms
provide a necessary foundation from which to approach the problem. A word of
warning is that understanding through models and descriptions is only useful if
it enables more efficient countermeasures. Results need to be put to work if they
are to have any impact.
3.9 Looking Forward
After studying the literature for a wide range of responses to phishing attacks it
was found that one is not more useful that the other, but that a combination of
countermeasures is needed if the threat of phishing is to be addressed success-
fully. e findings can be used to identify the relevance of Gambetta’s theories
surrounding mimicry. is is the focus of the next section.
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4 Revisiting Gambetta
ephishing literature provides a lot of results that can form the basis of a reeval-
uation of Gambetta’s framework. In the previous section there is ample evidence
that most of the assumptions that Gambetta makes do not hold true.e finding
that phishing statistics are hard to come by invalidates the assumption that users
know the likelihood of running into a phishing and the potential consequences.
Usability evaluations showed that many users do not spot trust indicators, inval-
idating the assumption that users know the signals that are available. e need
for systems that do not rely on the user was observed, since they tend to make
errors and are unmotivated about security. Also, users did not always process
information at the cognitive level, and instead made behavioural decisions.
ese findings are rather ravaging for the framework. Although it works in
situations where the players need to be extremely rational because of environ-
mental pressures, it does not seem to be applicable to the character of the In-
ternet. However, we feel that one of the cornerstones of the model still stands,
namely that trustworthiness is not directly observed, but instead mediated by
signs.While it has been observed that frameworks with non-functional assump-
tions can still be used in reasoning about a problem [], we feel it is appropriate
to upgrade the framework in the face of the research into phishing, and some
other sources.
4.1 Revisiting Rationality
e security behaviour of users has been both called rational and irrational. Ra-
tional because if users spend a significant amount of time checking trust indi-
cators this would lead to more productivity loss than the yearly damage due to
phishing []. Irrational because the people often lack the appropriate informa-
tion and tend to trade long-term privacy for small short term gain []. How ra-
tionality is defined will lead to different views of the problem.
Research into privacy decisions of users has shown that users are decidedly
non-rational when weighed against objective measures. Behavioural biases, am-
biguity, and uncertainty play a role in causing irrational user behaviour []. An-
other list of causes is incomplete information, bounded rationality, and psycho-
logical deviations from rationality []. When privacy concerns are made salient
to users, they are less likely to divulge personal information, even if the risk
would be low, while suppressing privacy concerns leads user to divulge infor-
mation even if it is not in their best interest []. In a test of the perceived trust-
worthiness of various forms of media representations of experts it was found
that users have a media bias, preferring audio and video over text advice [].
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ere has been progress in economics away from the purely rational-choice
models that are appealing but descriptively incomplete, towards more thorough
conceptions such as procedural (or bounded) rationality []. is has been ac-
companied with a lot of scientific evidence that refutes various of the assump-
tions made in rational choice theory.e theory of bounded rationality seems to
offer a variable alternative to rational-choice theory. Bounded rationality finds
that individuals are limited in their rationality though intuitive actions and and
the impact of a specific cognitive focus []. Humans do not tend to optimise,
and instead satisfice or seek outcomes that are good enough []. Rationality is
bounded by limited information and limited processing capacity. Instead of the
assumptions of rational-choice theory it seems that models of phishing must
work with theories such as bounded rationality.
4.2 A Tentative Model
Apart from the mediating function of signs in trust decisions, the framework of
Gambetta needs a lot of corrections. e adjustments presented here are based
on insights gleamed in the previous sections of this paper.
e ability to display a credential depends on the individual’s link to the cre-
dential. ose credentials that have links to many people have an increased risk
of misuse. Users may traverse the credential graph through authentication in
order to create links to other systems and credentials. In order to choose secure
credentials an analysis can be made into the properties and entry points of the
available credentials.
e effectiveness of signals mediating trustee characteristics is determined
by the design of the system One aspect is the ability of a system to make its own
decisions so that it may filter out mimics before they can communicate with
the user, while the other aspect is correctly conveying credentials to the user.
e system thus serves as a filter that can remove both communication from
mimics as well as valuable evidence that a mimic is on the loose. Another filter
is the perception of the user, which can often be wrong. When the user has the
wrong perceptions they may employ phantom credentials, that do not provide
any evidence pertaining to the trustworthiness of the the trustee.
Users process phishing messages on multiple levels. e behavioural level
depends on conditioned responses, while the cognitive level involves the appli-
cation of bounded rationality. Displaying the wrong behavioural cues can lead
the user to process themessage at too shallow a level. Evenwhen processing hap-
pens at the cognitive level users are liable to make mistakes. As users are limited
in the amount of information they can process, their ability to process credentials
is expected to drop as the number of credentials grows. Equation  shows such
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behaviour for positive values of x, although the function of the equation is purely
illustrative. Such descriptions can also be constructed for the other processing
layers through which credentials pass.
percentage of credentials observed ∝ nr of credentials displayed −x ()
e tentative model presented here shows that credentials are not objec-
tively analysed, but instead they go through several filter layers, namely the se-
curity layer, the usability layer, the perception layer, the behavioural layer, and
the cognitive layer, before a decision can be made as to the trustworthiness of
the trustee. By focussing on the signals that mediate trust-warranting properties
the model looks at the authentication behaviour of users in the face of mimicry.
is allows more of a focus on the human element of the authentication, which
may provide more secure systems where humans are the weakest link. e next
section will apply the framework to the problem of browser interact design in
the hope of finding potential solutions.
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5 Finding Solutions
Based on the tentative model in the previous section it is possible to evaluate
systems to look for possible improvements. is section provides a look at the
design of some parts of web browser interfaces, as well a quick rundown of some
promising avenues for further research.
5.1 Cognitive Walkthroughs
e analysis process is explained with the help of cognitive walkthroughs. ese
are a way of imagining the thoughts and actions of users when they use a sys-
tem for the first time []. It works from a specification of the prototype and the
intended users, a description of the tasks to be carried out, and a list of actions
needed to do so. When doing the cognitive walkthrough a plausible story is gen-
erated about each of the user’s tasks, and all of the user’s actions are motivated.
e questions have been proposed [] for evaluating the user’s actions are:
• Will users be trying to produce whatever effect the action has?
• Will users see the control (button, menu, switch, etc.) for the action?
• Once users find the control, will they recognise that it produces the effect
they want?
• After the action is taken, will users understand the feedback they get, so
they can go on to the next action with confidence?
A hypothetical user is walked down the list of actions to be completed, and their
likely feedback is evaluated.When they are expected to get stuck this is recorded
and the tester continues as if the user had completed the task correctly to evalu-
ate the other actions on the list. e method is regarded as a good way of quickly
identifying usability problems with a product.
5.2 Web Browser Interfaces
e security behaviour that is investigated here is the simple act of verifying the
website publisher’s identity. e product is the Firefox  web browser, users are
taken to behave as has been found in previous sections, the task to be carried
out is verifying the authenticity of a webpage, which consist of the actions of
checking whether SSL is enabled, parsing the URL, verifying whether it matches
with the user’s expectation. In Firefox , which was released this summer, the
variably highlighted URL bar was introduced. e base of the URL is now black,
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Figure : Example of how Firefox  handle URLs
with the rest of the URL greyed out, as shown in figure . e latest versions
of Internet Explorer and Chrome do a similar thing, although Chrome does not
grey out subdomains. Whether these measures help prevent phishing attacks is
investigated through a cognitive walkthrough of the Firefox  interface.
e first action of the user is checking whether SSL is enabled on the web-
page. To do so the user has to observe the URL bar and check whether Firefox
displays the base address bar in blue or green dedicated box. Various papers dis-
cussed in the section on phishing found that many users do not notice when the
SSL notifications are absent. An explanation of this is that the credentials are
filtered by the perception layer since they are at the periphery of the user’s vi-
sion. Also, users may mistake a favicon for security indicators, not be interested
in checking the validity of the website, or not understand the concept of certifi-
cates. If users do notice that SSL is enabled by seeing the blue or green box in
the URL bar they need to parse the URL. Users may not parse the URL prop-
erly because they don’t give any or enough attention to it or because they don’t
understand the concept of a URL. is can be explained by users being stuck at
the behavioural layer, and merely reacting to erroneous impulses, or as a result
of cognitive processing that relies on incorrect information. e last action that
the user needs to do is to verify whether the parsed URL corresponds to their
expectations. Many users have been found to accept URLs that are semantically
similar to their expectation as correct. Such users do not produce the intended
effect of the action. Another problem can be that users neglect to check whether
the URL matches at all. Such user responses can be the result of the bounded ra-
tionality when processing at the cognitive level, or compulsive behaviour at the
behavioural level.
From the cognitive walkthrough above it becomes clear that domain high-
lighting may not offer much solace for users of Firefox . While it may make the
action of URL parsing a little bit easier for the user the task of identifying web-
sites is marred by difficulties. A design for a browser interface is proposed that
makes the action of URL parsing close to irrelevant. Figure  shows the inter-
face where the URL bar is removed and tabs are labeled with the base domain
name. Entering a web address happens in the search box, which helps prevent
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Figure : Mockup of the proposed browser interface
landing on a wrong website due to typos. When information is presented to the
user that can be controlled by an attacker extra care needs to be taken []. e
website title is not displayed in the browser windows in order to take away the
ability of phishers to display information in any area besides the web page. is
was also the reason for replacing the tab title with the domain name.e reason-
ing behind this is that the model described in the previous section suggest that
number of credentials that users pay attention to decreases as the total number
of credentials increase. While the title of the webpage is a very unreliable cre-
dentials there may be users that incorrectly rely on it. Additionally it detracts
from the most relevant credential, which is the presence of SSL along with the
correct domain. e reasoning behind the choice of not displaying the full URL
is that many users do not have sufficient information to make proper choices at
the cognitive level, or may default to compulsive behavioural responses because
of the cost of parsing URLs.
e actions that are not addressed by themockup, and that remain problem-
atic, are determining SSL status and domain matching. Many users focus solely
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User Interface Spoofing Attacks
Popular web browsers today do not allow arbitrary websites to modify the text displayed in the address bar 
or to hide the address bar (some browsers may allow popups to hide the address bar, but in such cases, the 
URL is then displayed in the title of the window). The reasoning behind this behavior is quite simple: if 
browsers can be influenced by arbitrary web applications to hide the URL or to modify how it is displayed, 
then malicious web applications can spoof User Interface elements to display arbitrary URLs, thus tricking 
the user into thinking he or she is browsing a trusted site.
Using an iPhone, browse to the following demo and keep an eye out on the address bar: 
http://www.dhanjani.com/iphone-safari-ui-spoofing/
Figure 6: Image on the left illustrates the page rendered, which displays the ‘fake’ URL bar while the real URL bar is 
hidden above. Image on the right illustrates the real URL bar that is visible once the user scrolls up.
As illustrated in Figure 6, notice that the address bar stays visible while the page renders, but immediately 
disappears as soon as it is rendered. While this may give the user some time to notice, it is, however, not a 
reasonably reliable control (and Apple probably did not intend this to be a reliable control).
The primary reason for this behavior is to maximize the screen real-estate on the iPhone. However, since the 
address bar in Safari occupies considerable space, perhaps Apple may consider displaying or scrolling the 
current domain name right below the universal status bar (i.e. below the carrier and time stamp). Positioning 
the current domain context in a location that is unalterable by the rendered web content can provide the 
users similar indication that browsers such as IE and Chrome provide by highlighting the current domain 
being rendered.
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Figure : An example of a spoofed URL bar on the iPhone []
on the appearance of a website [], which is und rstandable since it takes up
more than  of screen real estate. To deal with this issue more research is nec-
essary into creating signals that are likely to be perceived by the user. e prob-
lem of domai matching could be add essed th ough a more draconian frame-
work for domain registration, such that semantically similar domain names can-
not be registered.e impact on freedom of expression and associated costs will
need to be investigated. Aminor issue in themockup is deciding how to deal with
extremely long domain names that do not fit within the tab width. Also note that
the security indicators are not specified. ese could be a green tab colour, or
whatever other signals are found to be effective. Lastly, the privacy issues that
come up due to the use of search engines as intermediaries for URL entry needs
to be addressed. One solution may be comparing URL to the local history, and
only checking with the search engine when necessary.
Based on the findings of this example we feel that cognitive walkthroughs,
coupled with insights from the framework described in previous sections, allows
for a thorough analysis of system security and the finding of countermeasures.
Many systems seem to be able to benefit from such an analysis. One example is
mobile browsers, where the URL bar can be hidden using simple JavaScript [].
is vulnerability was presented back in  [], but is still present in many
browsers []. An example of a spoofed URL bar is presented in figure , which
shows the danger of mimicry in the face of problematic design.

5.3 Other Avenues
Besides cognitive walkthroughs building on a conception of the user as proposed
in the tentativemodel, solutions to the problemof phishingmight be found in the
analysis of human protocols, the creation of signals that discriminate between
computers and humans, and evaluating why human are successful at the use of
biometrics.
Currently information security is quite focussed ondealingwith bit and bytes,
with society often located outside the research focus. e problem with this is
that the traditional focus of security is too narrow, since the larger world has
been dealing with security questions long before computers and computer net-
works appeared []. Human-scale security protocols (HSSP) are seen as a vi-
able research area that would allow designers to take input from non-traditional
protocols to strengthen information security protocols. e high-level security
protocols of human-to-human interaction have evolved over many centuries to
deal with human problems. HSSP are relevant because they are often optimised
for efficiency and performance, even though they tend to operate in an ad-hod
fashion. While traditional and HSSP studies may pollinate one-another, HSSP
are said to have the greatest prospects since they are human systems that have
evolved over time and are likely to be well optimised and tuned to risk.
By discriminating between human and computer users the cost of an attack
could be increased. Research into human interaction proofs (HIP) has sought to
find ways of distinguishing between humans and computers. Traditionally the
focus was filtering bots, but a new class of HIP allows human to distinguish
computers []. It was found that HIP can be used to secure human-machine
interaction where an untrusted intermediary is present []. If this untrusted
intermediary is a machine it will not be able to read the exchanges information;
if the untrusted intermediary is a human then listening in on this channel will
bemore expensive than automated wiretapping.ese tools aremost relevant in
cases where transactions are completed since humans may later learn the values
that were exchanged. Nonetheless, it is an interesting approach for some prob-
lems. An issue that needs to be kept in mind is how disabled users can make
use of the system []. Also, like CAPTCHA generation can be provided as a
web service [] (e.g. reCAPTCHA), solving CAPTCHA and other HIP may be
turned into a service built on outsourcing to low-wage labour countries.
Biometrics is sometimes referred to as the odd one out when it comes to
authentication, since it is much more fuzzy than cryptographic algorithms and
protocols. However, humans have used biometrics since the start of time for
doing authentication. Maybe inspiration can be taken from the general success-
fulness of biometrics in human protocols. We propose the term technometrics

for signals that represent properties of a technical system, and that are easy for
humans to perceive and verify. Random Art [] is one such technometric that
makes use of the visual cortex, but possible alternatives that come to mind are
soundscapes, electrical currents, and smell creators (for the deduction of cheesy
terminology relating to phishing the reader is left to their own device). Comput-
ers have various sources of distinctiveness that can serve as the basis to techno-
metrics. A recent example is the possibility of extracting device signatures from
NAND flash storage [].
e opportunities for making mimicry difficult by increasing the discrimi-
natory potential are vast. Of the research that has been done in this area, most
is dispersed across subfields. In order to deal problems of mimicry in informa-
tion security such as phishing it may be advisable to tackle the problem in a
more structured manner. A possible banner under which to place such an ef-
fort is ‘mimicry during authentication’. Because the goal of such research would
be looking for discriminatory credentials the ethical issues associated with this
cannot be ignored, and are thus the topic of the next section.
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6 Ethics
It has been established that credentials enable discrimination between authentic
entities and mimics to various degrees: credentials are discriminatory. is has
inherent ethical implications, which is raised by Gambetta and Hamill but not
addressed in much detail []. ey argue that discrimination by their sample
of taxi drivers is ethical because of the grave threat that the drivers face and the
effectiveness of discrimination. ere is the potential for those who look suspi-
cious to adapt their behaviour, but there are limits to this. In information secu-
rity the threat is also there, but ethical issues become much more pronounced
because the threat to life is often not there and the issue may be more visible.
Whether such dilemmas are a result of a difference between the online and of-
fline world is not too clear, but most likely this is not the main differentiator. In-
stead, the use of information technology has allowed far more automation with
respect to profiling, categorisation, and sharing as a result of more processing
power and greater connectivity [].
6.1 Biometrics
A class of credentials that seems especially problematic is biometrics. While
cryptography may link bits to individuals, these bits have much less baggage as-
sociated with them than biometric credentials. Technometrics seem less prob-
lematic because computers are not granted rights to privacy. Whether this will
change when artificial intelligences approach human capabilities is an interest-
ing question, but for nownot relevant. Amore pressing question iswhether users
are able to use systems that deploy technometrics. Disabled individuals may not
have the cognitive capabilities to register signals sent by a machine: e.g. blind
users cannot make use of visual hashes.
One of themain issueswith the use of biometrics is the informatisation of the
body []. e camera captures someone’s appearance, the phonograph their
voice, and DNA sequencing their genes. When computers entered the scene,
and things became digitised, traditional boundaries no longer worked, and peo-
ple’s informatisated bodies could escape and roam cyberspace, separated from
their worldly shells. Before long digital body parts started being traded like com-
modities, which leads to questions of human dignity: a core concern with the use
biometrics [].
Providing a biometric means giving over ‘a piece of ourselves’ []. As control
of biometric information is relinquished to varying degrees, privacy problems
start to pop up. Currently,many users are not fully aware of the risks and vendors
are too dismissive of privacy concerns, which has led to calls for the need of
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free and informed consent []. However, this has been argued to be impossible,
due not only to the limited understanding of individuals, but also due to the
fundamental opaqueness of future scientific developments []. Consequently,
for the informatisation of bodies to provide individual and communal benefit
the discussion about biometrics would have to move to the level of technical
infrastructures and intermediate institutions.
Mouse movement based authentication systems have been proposed that
have decent detection rates []. However, the effectiveness of mouse based au-
thentication has been questioned, noting that the low error rates are likely due
to loosely controlled environmental variables []. Even so, there are measur-
able individual differences, and mouse movements can give information about
the user’s psychological state, and properties of the software and surface texture.
Although mouse based authentication may not be terribly effective at authenti-
cating individuals, it could provide a technique for companies to filter out po-
tential clients that pose higher risks, such as those with Parkinson’s disease.
Research has shown that potentially sensitive information about a woman’s
sex life can be derived from recordings of their gait []. Note that this is prelim-
inary research, but the mechanism behind it is supported by findings in other
studies. Similar research based on the shape of the upper lip has also been done
[]. ese results raise interesting questions about data collection and reten-
tion, and shows that the use of biometrics may leak more information that typ-
ically assumed. e use of biometric information, even when it does not at first
sight pose any ethical dilemmas, needs to be extensively investigated if privacy
is to be safeguarded. Where consequences are unclear it may be better to rely on
the precautionary principle [].
It’s safe to say that not even half the kinds of information that can be gleamed
from people’s behaviour and bodies are known. In light of this there needs to be
a serious discussion about what biometrics can potentially disclose about indi-
viduals, and whether society is really better off when this information is floating
around in the ether. Will governments, companies, and other actors choose to
make use of this information in a socially and individually desirable perspective?
What if biometrics allow with high likelihood the observation of traits that are
undesirable in the current political system? When technologies have the poten-
tial to enable a witch hunt they should not be introduced haphazardly.
6.2 Other Credentials
Discrimination based on credentials does not restrict itself to biometrics. Cre-
dentials that are not directly related to a person’s body or behaviour can be the
basis of selective treatment.Whether such selective treatment is ethical depends
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on the social and individual impact. Consider the requirement that a job candi-
date display a degree from a reputed university. Although it may serve as an ef-
fective signal for weeding out promising candidates, the use of this signal brings
upmany questions concerning access to education, appropriate spending of pub-
lic money, the institutionalisation of expertise, the role of gatekeepers, and op-
portunities for those with alternative backgrounds.ese questions are too deep
to delve in here, but they are one illustration of the problematisation of the use
of credentials. Less ethically ambiguous uses of credentials are biased hiring-
selection based on gender cues and access control on mobile phone networks
based on running through a challenge-response protocol correctly.
On the Internet a big issue when it comes to credentials is automated index-
ing, slicing, bundling, and reselling of personal information and related practices
such as targeted advertisements, all based on identification and reidentification.
e largest threat to people’s online privacy and self-determination is proba-
bly the advertising industry. Credentials allow the observation of an individual’s
characteristics and may compromise their privacy. is is especially true when
they allow the unique identification of an individuals, and even more so when
this is possible over multiple encounters. By identifying and reidentifying indi-
viduals, and collection as much information as possible about their preferences,
advertisers seek to provide more targeted advertisements. Going by the tech-
niques used by advertisers they seem to be a rather unscrupulous bunch. Ad-
vertisers use many of the same techniques as con artists, which raises questions
of ethics and legality []. Going by the tactics and half-truths of advertisers it
seems that their use of credentials should be prevented.
When credentials are presented to multiple organisation (such as an IP ad-
dress) trying to block theirmisuse is rather difficult.e question to be answered
is: is there a case for the use of the credential of should it be engineered away?
Taking the IP address example, using an anonymisation approach will prevent
the display of the credential, but it will also prevent legitimate uses, such as the
authentication check during Facebook login. If a system requires the use a class
of credentials, but their abuse should be prevented, an approach is needed to
prevent the display of credentials in specific scenarios. One way is the use of
filters based on whitelists or blacklists coupled with an anonymising proxy. An
alternative mechanism is the institution of a legal framework. However, this has
enforcement issues, especially on a global network such as the Internet. Note
that not displaying a certain credential can be problematic when everyone else
is displaying the credential. In such a case the signals that people display need to
be standardised.
It was found that the use of certain credentials is ethically charged. is de-
pends upon the context in which they are displayed. ese contexts come about

from the actions of the participants as well as the designers and constructors of
the system, and their interactions. How these contexts will evolve over time is
unclear, and the discriminating potential of credentials could drastically change
as a result of future developments, such as the discovery of better datamining al-
gorithms.With the unclarity over the future impact of credentials it is difficult to
decide whether an application is safe or not. Still, current uses of credentials can
be analysed and problematised, thus providing more visibility of the issue. Also,
the incentives and power relations of players can be evaluated to detect possible
asymmetries that may build on the discriminating effects of credentials.
6.3 Control Structures
ediscussion of the ethical nature of credential choice points towards the broader
question of the ethical problems that come up in systems that are designed or
operated by aminority group. Some of the issues that arise are power, racial, eth-
nic, gender, and expertise asymmetries. In the information security sector such
asymmetries are also present. Although information security specialists should
be labouring on their own demise, it seems that structures have been put in place
that require continuous maintenance by a technocratic elite. Currently, there is
an obsession with risk management [] and auditing []. ese structures re-
sult in a centralisation of control and expertise, which is symptomatic of the
current state of information security.
One important point to remember is that control systems built for one pur-
pose can become control systems for another purpose if the controller has the
incentives to do so. is point becomes particularly problematic when looking
at the privatisation of security companies and the supply of services and goods
to suppressive regimes. Gatekeepers cannot be expected tomake objective deci-
sions, when those decisions are against their personal incentives (e.g. the social
comparison bias []). e role of gatekeepers is worthy of a serious discussion.
Power relations build, and build on, the credentials that discriminate between
individuals.
6.4 Guidance
Mimicry preventing technologies are not alone in their potential to lead to dis-
crimination and segregation of society: information security research has shown
how to both cloak and fingerprint individuals, how to both hide and recover data,
how to both fix and hack computer systems. e choices that researchers make
have implications far beyond the lab, and they can hardly look to governments
or companies to ensure that ethical principles are followed. If ethical guidelines
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are to be followed they need to be engineered into the system. is requirement
goes further than privacy by design []: researchers should seek ethics by design.
However, we still have legacy systems, and like the need for privacy by redesign
[] we should be seeking ethics by redesign. In order to do this the reevaluation
of discriminatory potential seems a good place to start.
When deciding on credentials to use it is paramount to think of the ethical
implications of one’s choices. Whenever credentials are created or used that can
be used for societal discrimination there is the potential for society to be worse
off. It appears that something similar to a privacy impact assessment (PIA) []
may be needed for credentials, which looks at the potential for credentials to
ostracise individuals from society, which we refer to as a discriminatory impact
assessment (DIA). e illustrative equation  shows a way to go about weighing
security against social impact, whereby the provided security is clearly shown
to be adequate and the potential for distinguishing mimics from genuine users
exceeds the potential for adverse societal impact. e weight and quantification






Designers have a moral obligation to design systems that do not allow cheap
and easy prosecution of minority groups or control byminority groups. Looking
to the market to provide imperatives to do so is foolish, keeping in mind that
markets are amoral. Governments have rather spotty track records, even those
exalting the virtues of human rights. Asking individuals to protect themselves is
problematic when the issues are shrouded in gobbledygook. What is needed is a
clear and enlightened discourse, unmuddled by financial and political interests,
to determine guiding principles for the design, development, and deployment of
technologies. is section on the discriminatory potential of credentials seeks
to be one part of such a discourse.

7 Conclusion
e main contribution of this paper is thought to be putting the problem of
mimicry on the research agenda, and describing a model that enables the evalu-
ation of a system’s susceptibility to mimicry. In the course of this paper most of
the objectives that were defined at the start have been attained. e importance
of mimicry was shown, Gambetta’s theories have been explained, the phishing
literature was analysed, a new framework based on the core of Gambetta’s theo-
ries has been created and applied to the problemof browser interface design, and
the ethical dilemmas surrounding credentials have been described. e objec-
tives that remain are presenting testable predications and sketching a roadmap
for further research into mimicry.
A theory is only useful if it makes testable predictions.e predictions of the
tentative model described in this paper are the importance of signs in building
trust in the mind of the user, the layered nature of trust evaluation, the limi-
tations of users with respect to bounded rationality and impulsive behaviours,
and the characteristic of a system as one that filters signals before they reach the
user and are subject to further filtering. Future research should focus on checking
the validity of the predictions of the model, since this was merely an exploratory
study. Also, the model can be applied to a wide range of problems in informa-
tion security where mimicry is present. Such an effort would look a ‘mimicry in
authentication’ in its broadest sense.
System designers should use the results of this research to pick, grow, and
nurture the right credentials through careful analysis, appropriate systemdesign,
and continuous system updates. If this is done information security systems can
be made secure in the face of mimicry. Currently, there are many credentials
that are not used in authentication scenarios, even though they can help detect
mimics. ese can be used by designers to build systems that are secure in the
face ofmimicry.e coremessage of this paper is that credentials enable a type of
discrimination that has the potential to increase system security, but can become
unethical if used outside the appropriate context.
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